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heterodox  economists  have  generally  made  non‐systemic  reform 
proposals. This paper draws on Marxist theory to argue that systemic 
change is necessary, including conversion of failed private into public 









is  uniquely at  fault, and nor has the  turbulence been  caused  by  malpractice  in  a small 
number of institutions. The failure is also systemic because several large commercial banks 
in  the USA,  the UK and elsewhere have been eﬀectively bankrupt during  2008‐9.    Had 
governments allowed these to fail, it is probable that there would have been general banking 
collapse.  On  the  other  hand,  mere  prevention  of  bankruptcy  through  extraordinary 
measures has not resolved the underlying systemic banking problems. As a result, there has 
been persistent disruption of the supply of credit, exacerbating the global recession. It is 
unlikely that  sustained accumulation  will  be restored  without  confronting  the  failure  of 
banking. 
The systemic nature of the crisis has been highlighted by heterodox economists, particularly 
post‐Keynesians. For  a brief  period in 2007‐8, talk  of  a ‘Minsky moment’  even  attained 
global  prominence (Whalen 2007). The content  of this ‘Minsky moment’  has never been 
entirely clear,  but  the term  drew on Minsky’s theory of endogenous ﬁnancial  instability 
(1986, 1992,  1996; and Minsky and Whalen  1996).  Minsky claimed that  ‘money manager 
capitalism’ had emerged in the USA after the Second World War, pivoting on pension and 
mutual funds, and favouring short‐termism. Thus, ‘money manager capitalism’ encouraged 
the  systematic migration of capitalist  enterprises  from  ‘hedge’  to  ‘speculative’  to  ‘Ponzi’ 









suggested  a  compromise.  For  Kregel,  the  crisis  is  Minskyan  because  adjustable  rate 
subprime  borrowers  acted  as  Ponzi  units  that  relied  on  remortgaging  and  house  price 
increases to  ﬁnance past loans.    More signiﬁcantly, the crisis  is also  Minskyan because, 
during  the  bubble,  banks  exhausted  their  liquidity  cushions,  rendering  themselves vulnerable to  subprime default. Along similar lines, Nesvetailova (2008)  claimed that the 
systemic disappearance of liquidity is a Minskyan process characteristic of the crisis. 
Other heterodox economists have used Minsky in a more generic sense, but similarly to 




USA.  More  complexly, and relying on a far broader range of analytical  and  institutional 
arguments, Crotty  (2008,  2009)  has  claimed that  the crisis is due to  the New Financial 
Architecture that has emerged during the last three to four decades. A globally integrated 




analysis  of  the  crisis.  This  makes  it  all  the  more striking,  therefore,  that  the  proposed 
reforms  and  policy  changes  have  been  non‐systemic.  Thus,  Kregel  (2009a,  2009b),  has 
suggested  that  shortages  of  liquidity  should  be  dealt  with  by  raising  wages  instead  of 
lowering  interest  rates  to  zero.  He  has  also  advocated  universal  banking  (combining 
commercial and investment banking activities) but with closer matching of maturities and 
tighter control over the size of loans, emulating German practices. 
Similarly,  Crotty  and  Epstein  (2008,  2009)  have  oﬀered  a  nine‐point  programme  for 
ﬁnancial regulation that ranges from reducing asymmetric incentives and moral hazard by 
regulating bonuses, to extending regulatory oversight over ‘shadow banking’, to prohibiting 
the sale of ‘too  complex’  ﬁnancial securities, to  adopting countercyclical capital adequacy 





the crisis. Mainstream  economics is  aware of the systemic nature of the crisis, but  lacks 
systemic  theories  of  ﬁnancial  instability.  Nonetheless,  it  has  already  put  forth  concrete 
empirical accounts of institutional faults  within  the ﬁnancial system  that have mutually 
interacted and presumably led to disaster (Brunnermeier 2009). Not surprising, theoretical 
emphasis has been laid on the disappearance of liquidity. An inﬂuential model has shown 
that ‘funding liquidity’ (the ease of borrowing by the trader) and ‘market liquidity’ (the ease of  selling  an  asset)  could  be  mutually  destabilising,  if  margins  rose  due  to  imperfect 
information  of  ﬁnanciers  and  rising  fundamental  volatility  (Brunnermeir  and  Pedersen 
2008). Earlier and related work  had shown  that  vicious circles  of  market liquidity  were 
possible,  and  if  panic  appeared,  liquidity  could  disappear  down  a  ‘black  hole’  (Persaud 
2002).  Furthermore,  mainstream  theorists  are  aware  of  the  systemic  failure  of  risk 
management  by  banks,  describing  the  underlying  cause  of  the  crisis  as  ‘mispricing  of 
risk’ (Goodhart 2008). 
Remarkably, mainstream economists have been more daring ‐ and even more systemic ‐ in 
recommending  reform  than  post‐Keynesians.  Several  partial  reforms,  including 
countercyclical  regulation of capital adequacy, maturity matching of assets and liabilities, 
altering banker remuneration, changing the ﬂawed practices of credit rating, and more, have 
been  proposed  (Brunnermeir,  et.  al.  2009;  Dewatripont,  et.  al.  2009).  However,  other 
mainstream economists have also recommended outright nationalisation of banks (Stiglitz 





related  to  Minsky’s  own  reluctance  to  advocate  public  or communal  ﬁnance.  But  such 
timidity is problematic in view of the depth of the current crisis. Private banking has failed 
in  a  systemic  way,  and  responses  to  it  should  be  equally  systemic,  with  the  aim  of 
permanently changing  the balance  between  private  and  public in  ﬁnance. Public banks 
could  be  instrumental  in  eﬀectively  confronting  the  crisis  as  well  as  restructuring  the 
ﬁnancial system and the economy for the long term. 
Public banks are a long‐standing  socialist  demand,  put  forth by Marxist economists (for 
instance, Hilferding  1981). Examining  their potential  role in the current  crisis,  therefore, 
oﬀers  scope  for  fruitful  interaction  between  post‐Keynesian  and  Marxist  approaches  to 
ﬁnance. There is a long record of exchange of ideas between the two currents, the roots of 
which can be found in the nineteenth century monetary tradition of the Banking School. 
The  present  crisis  allows  ‐  but  also  calls  ‐  for  wider  cross‐fertilisation  of  heterodox 
approaches on ﬁnance. The severity of the crisis and the complex economic problems it has 








First,  industrial  and  commercial  enterprises  have  become  adept  at  obtaining  external 
ﬁnance in open markets, thus lessening their reliance on banks. Enterprises have become 












while  public  provision  in  housing,  health,  education  and  pensions  has  retreated. 
Consequently, private ﬁnance has emerged as mediator of the acquisition of vital goods that 
enter  the  wage  basket,  such  as  housing.  At  the  same  time,  private  ﬁnance  has  come 
increasingly to handle savings and other provision of workers for old age. The emergence of 
private  ﬁnance  as  mediator  of  workers’  consumption  and  savings  has  allowed  it 
systematically  to  extract  proﬁts  directly  out  of  wages  and  salaries.  This  process  has 
elsewhere been characterised as ﬁnancial expropriation (Lapavitsas 2009).
In  this  light,  the  turmoil  that  commenced  in  August  2007  represents  a  crisis  of 
ﬁnancialisation. In the 2000s private ﬁnance intensiﬁed its turn toward personal income, 
buttressed  by  investment  banking  activities,  above  all,  securitisation.  The  extraction  of 











individual  workers  (Lapavitsas  2009).  On  the liability side,  banks  increasingly  relied on 






















Following  the  Lehman  shock,  US  and  UK  central  banks  adopted  ‘quantitative  easing’, 
another Japanese practice of the early part of this decade. This amounts to systematic over‐




















































bad  assets  from  bank  balance  sheets  but  also,  second,  to  ensure  either  recovery  of 
securitisation, or the emergence of alternatives to it. The former is considered immediately 
below, the latter in section 3.     Removing  bad  assets  is  a  standard  requirement  of  banking  crises.  However,  the 
private nature of banks complicates the problem. Banks have been at pains to conceal the 
















  Therefore, private banks  have found themselves in a quandary.  If bad assets were 
removed rapidly and in market terms, several would become irrevocably bankrupt; but if 
banks  continued  to  carry  bad  assets  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  better  ﬁnal  prices,  their 
balance sheets would remain illiquid, preventing normal banking functions. The longer that 
normal  banking was interrupted, the more bad assets would probably accumulate in the 











supposed  to  carry all  residual  risk,  which  makes  them  liable to  the full  extent  of  their holdings. In the absence of state support, the value of bank shares would have collapsed 





















nature  of  ﬁnancial  policy  making  (and  the  privileged access of banks  to  it)  have  made 
democratic decision making more diﬃcult, while protecting bank stakeholders. 
  Some  of  these  complexities  are  apparent  in  the  debate  that  has  emerged  on 
aggregating bad assets in a ‘bad bank’, or equivalently, creating ‘good banks’.  Thus, Buiter 








circumvent  the political  and  ideological  obstacles  posed  by  the private  nature of banks, 
which created the problem in the ﬁrst place.    The policy actually adopted by US administrations in late 2008 and early 2009 should 
be seen in light of the above. Removing bad assets was proclaimed a priority by the Bush 





  Geithner’s  plan  shared  the  assumption  that  bad  debts  reﬂect  the  drying  up  of 
liquidity, rather than bad credit decisions (Bebchuk 2009). Its objective, therefore, was to 
remove these assets by restarting the market for securitised securities, while securing for the 
banks  the  highest  possible  price.  Driving  the  plan  was  the  determination  to  avoid 






prepared to  countenance reasonable losses,  the auctioning process should result  in high 
prices. 






















had  already  received  more  than  $300bn  of  capital  injections  from  TARP,  typically  as 
preferred stock with guaranteed interest payments. There had also been two bouts of capital 
injections by the UK government, while several continental European banks also received 










of  bank  books.  But  to  avoid  even  the  appearance  of  nationalisation,  the  US  and  UK 
governments were chary of such action. 
  Consequently, in March 2009 the Obama administration introduced the Supervisory 
Capital  Assessment  Program  ‐  ‘stress tests’  of nineteen  banks ‐  to  be  conducted by  US 
regulatory authorities on the  basis of  information  requested  from  the banks. Instead  of 
taking charge of the stricken banks, US authorities relied on the banks’ own assessment of 
bad debts under a ‘baseline’ and a ‘more adverse’ scenario of the behaviour of the economy 
as  a  whole  (Federal  Reserve  2009a).  The  authorities  subsequently  tweaked  these 



















state  eﬀectively  insured  private  banks  against  bankruptcy  through  provision  of  capital, 
backing  for  assets,  and  guarantees  on  deposits.  On  the  other,  the  state  boosted  bank 
proﬁtability through  the disguised  subsidies discussed  in section 2.1.   Thus,  around  the 
middle of 2009, the largest US banks were permitted to repay some of the money they had 
received through TARP earlier in 2008‐9. 
  Banks were keen  to do  so despite having received these funds without signiﬁcant 
direct implications for ownership and control. Only relatively minor, and highly contested, 
conditions  were  applied,  requiring  banks  to  maintain  the  level  of  their  lending,  while 
limiting  the  exceptional  remuneration of management.  But  private  banks  resented even 
these  mild  conditions,  particularly  as  there  would  be  competitive  advantages  for those 
among them  that  managed to  shake  oﬀ  the  restrictions ﬁrst.  Consequently,  around  the 
middle of 2009 and barely nine months after the Lehman shock, the largest banks started to 
repay some of the TARP funds, while taking steps to restore management remuneration to 


























developed  in  the  last  three decades has  eﬀectively  failed.  This  is unprecedented  in  the 
history of industrial capitalism.
  Equally unprecedented is that the crisis has originated in mortgage lending in the 









ability  to  issue  bonds and  commercial  paper has  lessened  corporate  reliance  on  banks, forcing the latter to seek alternative ﬁelds of proﬁtability, which have varied from country to 






proﬁts deriving from  fees and commissions from handling  securities but,  above all,  from 
trading generally as well as on own account. These proﬁts diﬀer in kind from commercial 
banking  proﬁts,  which  derive primarily from the  spread between borrowing  and lending 
rates,  as  well  as  from  fees  and  commissions  to  handle  money  (foreign  exchange, 
transmission, managing accounts, and so on). Investment banking has some of the character 
of  broking,  while  also  dealing  on  own  account;  commercial  banking  is  ﬁnancial 
intermediation that also provides money‐dealing services. Systematically mixing the two can 
be profoundly destabilising. 












immediate  and  direct:  reliance  on  wholesale  funds  was  increased,  asset  liquidity  was 
reduced,  and solvency was  weakened.  Investment  banks in the USA  engaged  in  similar 
practices, only more extreme as they faced less regulation on capital and liquidity.
Note that the  failure of mortgage‐backed  securitisation is not  inherent  in the technique 
itself,  but  rather  due  to  the  private  and  competitive  nature  of  the  commercial  and 
investment  banks  involved.  The  large  state‐sponsored  organisations  of  the  US  housing market  (Federal  National  Mortgage  Association  and  Federal  Home  Loan  Mortgage 
Corporation) used securitisation for decades without comparable problems.  Disaster was 
induced  by  large‐scale  entry  of  commercial  and  investment  banks  into  mortgage 
securitisation in the early 2000s. This also encouraged the state‐sponsored organisations to 
emulate private bank behaviour, eventually causing their downfall in 2008. 
  At  a deeper level, however,  the failure  of combining  commercial  with  investment 





arms‐length,  computationally‐intensive  mathematical  techniques  that  draw  on  historical 
data (Lapavitsas and Dos Santos 2008). 
  By  adopting  investment  banking  functions,  commercial  banks  weakened  some  of 





workers who  had no  chance at  all  of repaying.  It  is  a measure  of the  failure  of private 
banking during 2001‐7 that it contrived to ignore these blindingly obvious sources of risk. 
  It is hard to exaggerate the long‐term importance of these phenomena. In the 1990s 































indebtedness relative  to  GDP  and  to  disposable income (Lapavitsas  2009).  Furthermore, 
individual  ﬁnancial  assets  have  also  grown  relative  to  GDP,  particularly  as  government 
policy in the USA, the UK and elsewhere systematically directed savings to capital markets. 
  For  banks,  these  trends  represent  expansion  of  the  ﬁeld  of  proﬁtability  through 
lending, but also through mediation of the ﬂow of savings to capital markets as well as of 







  Financial  proﬁt  systematically  generated  by  banks  that  orient  themselves  toward 
personal  income  raises  complex  theoretical  issues.  It  has  no  analogue  with  providing ﬁnancial services and loans to functioning capitalists, which are remunerated out of future 
proﬁts. Rather, lending to individuals has an aspect of the old practice of ‘trucking’ ‐ i.e. the 
employer providing wage goods at exorbitant prices in tied shops ‐ except that ‘trucking’ 
now  takes  place  on  a  social  scale  and  indirectly.  As  public  provision  has  retreated  in 
housing,  pensions,  and  so  on,  workers  have  had  to  rely  on  private  ﬁnance,  on  terms 
favourable to banks and ﬁnancial institutions. 
  More speciﬁcally, there are systematic disparities in information  and social  power 
between banks and individual workers. There are also systematic diﬀerences in motivation 
and purpose,  since  banks  aim  for monetary  proﬁt, while workers aim  for acquisition  of 
goods. In this context, it  is possible for eﬀectively usurious relations to emerge between 
banks and individuals, with exploitative aspects. Predatory lending is a part of the mediating 
role of banks relative to  workers, particularly of the weakest  layers of workers that  were 
previously subjected to ‘redlining’ (Dymski 2009). These complex mechanisms that resemble 
‘trucking’ and usury have elsewhere been called ﬁnancial expropriation (Lapavitsas 2009).
  The  bubble  of  2001‐7  in  the  USA  and  the  subsequent  crisis  resulted  from  an 
escalation of ﬁnancial expropriation. Financial  institutions reached the poorest and most 
oppressed  layers  of  workers,  often  black  and  Latino  women.  As  their  traditional  skills 










personal  indebtedness in the  USA,  the UK and elsewhere has  forced a retrenchment  of 
consumption.  Rising  unemployment  is  likely  to  exacerbate  these  phenomena  through 
second order eﬀects. The crisis has shown that private banking is ill‐suited to  mediating 
demand  for  housing,  pensions  and  several  other  goods  that  enter  the  wage  basket. 
Alternative mechanisms are necessary, with a clear public character.4. Establishing public banks – a rational and desirable step
  A systemic response to these failures of banking ought to include the conversion of 
private commercial  into public banks. Such  action would make it easier to  confront  the 
immediate pressures of the banking crisis as well as inﬂuencing the long‐term role of banks.  
4.1 Public banks to deal with the crisis
  Establishing  public banks  would  make  it  easier to  deal  with  the  crisis  because  it 
would lift the obstacles placed by private banks. This is apparent for liquidity, which has 
dried  up  because  of  the  collapse  of  trust  in  banks.  Public  banks  would  immediately 
command trust since they would be backed by society’s guarantees, resources, and money‐
creating  powers.  With  trust  restored,  liquidity  would  become  more  easily  available, 





transparently and democratically.  For one  thing,  public banks would have no  reason  to 
conceal  bad  debts incurred by private  banks,  and  nor would  they need to maintain  the 
ﬁction that  problematic assets are due to  liquidity  shortages.  Even  more  strongly, there 
would be no need to engage in the complex interactions and evasions of ‘stress tests’. Public 
supervisors  would  take  charge  of  bank  books  throwing  light  on  bad  credit  decisions, 
including irrecoverable housing loans to workers on low and stagnant incomes, speculative 
loans  to  commercial  real  estate,  purchases  of  mortgage‐backed  securities  without 
assessment of risk, and so on. 
  With full  revelation, it  would become possible to apportion resultant  losses using 









this  light,  establishing  public  banks  ought  to  be  more  than  mere  nationalisation,  and 
certainly not the simple replacement of failed private managers by state bureaucrats. Rather, 
public banks ought to be democratically run and fully accountable to society as a whole. The 
boards  of  public  banks  ought  to  have full  representation of popular interests, including 






recent  years,  bank  ‘governance’  has  been  based  on  ‘shareholder  value’  (Lazonick  and 
O’Sullivan  2000).  This  has  ultimately  drawn  on  the  eﬃcient  market  hypothesis,  which 
asserts the  merits of stock  markets in  assessing information about corporations and the 
economy. Corporations have engaged in a search for short term returns with no clear eﬀects 
on eﬃciency (Erturk et.al. 2004). For banks, meanwhile, the search for short‐term returns 
has  encouraged  ﬁnancial  engineering  in  open  markets  that  has  ruined  solvency  and 
liquidity. 
  ‘Shareholder  value’  has  also  encouraged  remuneration  schemes  for  traders  and 
managers that have fostered recklessness. Enormous bonuses have been systematically paid 
on  the basis  of  short‐term  performance,  with  little concern  for  long‐term  implications. 

















be a decisive source  of credit, given  that  the former have  easy access to  open  ﬁnancial 
markets.  But for  small  and  medium  enterprises,  as well  as  for individuals,  public banks 
would  be  indispensable  providers  of  ﬁnance.  Bank  borrowing  by  small  and  medium 
enterprises  (including  bank  mediated  trade  credit)  is  typically  necessary  for  ﬁxed  and 
circulating capital.  Borrowing by individuals, on the other hand, allows for smoothing  of 
consumption proﬁles, even if it has expropriating aspects under present conditions. Mature 
capitalist  economies  rely  on  such  credit  for  the  completion  of  countless  small  capital 
circuits, which sustain aggregate demand. In eﬀect, future output and personal income are 





was disrupted,  capital  circuits  and  individual  consumption would be disturbed,  possibly 
leading  to  rising  unemployment.  There reason  to  think  of provision  of such  credit  as  a 
public utility, akin to transport, electricity, water, and so on. 
  Naturally,  the analogy should  not  be stretched  too  far  as credit  is  not  a  normal 
commodity, but rather a set of economic relations based on trust and anticipation of future 
returns. The point is, however, that in contemporary capitalist societies broad layers of small 
enterprises but  also  workers  have  come  to  depend  on  the  steady  reproduction of  such 
relations.  Credit to individuals and to small enterprises already has a social  aspect,  as is 
manifested by its constant manipulation through regulations and central bank policy. Public 











establishing  public  banks  would  be part  of  a  general  reversal  of  the  ﬁnancialisation  of 
personal income during the last three decades. Public banks would oﬀer greater ﬂexibility in 







from  ﬁnance.  They  would  be  natural  institutions  to  guide  aggregate  investment  and 
promote  new  ﬁelds  of  activity,  including  ‘green’  industries  in  which  mature  capitalist 
economies appear to have a comparative advantage.
  Provision of development credit by public banks would necessarily take place within 
a  broad  institutional  framework  that  would  direct  aggregate  investment  toward socially 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П = 1/2(Y‐X) ‐ 1/14X             (1)
Hence,
E(П) = 1/2E(Y) ‐ 8/14X            (2)
Thus, 
max E(П) = 1/2E(Y)              (3)
Breakeven is at:
E(П) = 0, hence Xbr = 7/8E(Y)          (4)
Finally, maximum price is at: 
Xmax = 7/8Z               (5)
   The price paid will depend on E(Y). Since prices are determined at auction, it is likely 












bidders  are  likely  to  drive  prices  up  at  auction,  ultimately  pushing  X  toward  Xmax. 
Consequently, the scheme beneﬁts the banks, while shifting most of the risk onto the public 
which has provided the bulk of the funding.